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THEPROBLEM AND
A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Introduction
Some initial Assumptions
It seems to be generally agreed that newly developing countries will
need to achieve a rapid and sustained rise in export earnings to cover
their growing imports of capital goods and other essentials and to serv-
ice their foreign borrowings. Failure to attain such an increase, or to
receive ever larger foreign aid, would impose a foreign exchange con-
straint on their growth, even though the major transformation required
is in their internal economic and social structures and in their capacity
to save and invest.
Looked at from this point of view, the figures in Table 1 are not
reassuring with respect to the export performance of the less developed
countries.' Over the period 1950 to 1965 these countries, exclusive of
the major oil producers among them, increased the current dollar value
of their exports to the developed countries by 4.2 per cent annually on
the average.2 Their exports to each other, again omitting the major oil
producers, were only slightly larger in 1965 than in 1950. Over the
same period the dollar value of trade among the developed countries
rose at an average annual rate of about 9.4 per cent, or perhaps a
percentage point less if figured at constant prices. Total exports of
'Throughout this study the composition of the less developed countries corre-
sponds to that of "Economic Class II" in the foreign trade statistics of the United
Nations: all of the Western Hemisphere except the United States and Canada;
all of Africa except the Union of South Africa; the Middle East except Turkey;
the rest of Asia and the Far East except Japan, Mainland China, and North
Korea; and Oceania except Australia and New Zealand.
2 Figured at constant prices, the increase over the period as a whole would
average about the same, since export prices of the less developed countries rose
rapidly during the Korean War in the early 1950's and declined thereafter to
about the 1950 level.2Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
TABLE 1








World exports, total 53.5156.3 7.4
Exports of developed countries,
total 35.9122.5 8.5
To each other 25.095.5 9.4
To less developed countries 10.927.0 6.2
Exports of less developed
countries, total 17.633.8 4.5
To developed countries 12.426.2 5.2
To each other 5.2 7.6 2.5
Exports of less developed
countries, excluding major
0
petroleum producers,a total 14.123.7 3.6
To developed countries 10.018.5 4.2
To each other 4.1 5.2 1.7
Source: Various statistical publications of the United Nations.
Note:All figures exclude exports to and exports of Eastern Europe,
the USSR, and Mainland China. Figures may not add to totals shown
because of rounding.
aCountries excluded are Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Netherlands
Antilles, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
developed countries to the destinations covered by Table 1 were about
two and a half times those of the non-oil-producing less developed
countries in 1950 and were five times as great in 1965.
need for a faster increase in exports of the less developed coun-
tries will not be elaborated here, since it has been studied at length by
the United Nations and others. One may question alternative projec-
likely "foreign exchange gap," or the validity of the gapThe Problem and a Summary of Findings 3
approach.3 But there seems to be little room for doubt that, unless
economic aid to the less developed countries is increased far above
present levels, their exports will need to rise faster than heretofore as
one of the conditions for their economic development.
The contrasting performance of exports of developed and. less de-
veloped countries reflects, in addition to factors on the supply side,
the faster growth of world demand for manufactures than for most of
the primary products which make up the bulk of the exports of the less
developed countries. Reasons for the relative lag in trade in primary
products include economies in their use, the continuing development of
synthetic substitutes, and the growing complexity and sophistication
of final products, all of which tend to reduce the input of raw materials
per unit of output.4
Some less developed countries exceptionally well endowed with
natural resources may be able to meet their growing foreign exchange
needs through sales of primary products in crude or processed form.
The oil-exporting countries form a small and privileged group in
this regard. Broadly viewed, however, there is little reason to suppose
that the influences tending to retard the growth of trade in primary
products have run their course. If this is a correct judgment, a solution
commensurate with the growth needs of the less developed countries
will presumably entail a rapid increase in their exports of manufactures
to the affluent markets of the advanced countries.
Focus of the Study: Labor-Intensive Manufactures
This study seeks to identify the kinds of manufactures best suited to
the growth of exports and to examine the pattern and prospects of
A summary review of the estimates and their rationale is given by Sydney
Weintraub in The Foreign-Exchange Gap of the Developing Countries, Essays
in International Finance No. 48, Princeton, 1965.I. M. D. Little and J. M.
Clifford raise serious questions about the usefulness of the gap approach in
International Aid, London, 1965 (see especially Chapter. VI). Isaiah Frank ob-
serves that exports of the less developed countries increased faster in the first half
of the 1960's than in the preceding five years, thanks to accelerated economic
growth in ,the developed countries, but notes that the ability of the less developed
countries to import did not increase correspondingly because of greatly increased
payments for debt service, shipping, and other invisibles ("New Perspectives on
Trade and Development," Foreign Affairs, April 1967, pp. 520—540).
detailed analysis of the trade outlook for less developed countries is given
by Alfred Maizels in Industrial Growth and World Trade, Cambridge, Eng.,
1963. He concludes (page 409) that both the shift in the pattern of demand and
technological developments in the industrial countries are likelyto continue
to react adversely on the exports of the primary producing countries, and that
no alleviation is likely to come from changes in the terms of trade.4Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
trade in these items. By definition, the less developed countries have
little accumulated capital or technical skill. Any comparative advantage
which they may hold or attain in manufacturing for export, apart from
strongly resource-based industries, is therefore likely to be in industries
which are intensive in the use of relatively unskilled labor and sparing
in the use of both physical and human capital. It will be seen in this
study that industries rank much the same on this basis from country
to country, even from the richest to the poorest—a circumstance which
helps to identify those in which low-wage countries may best compete.
Such a course encounters obvious problems and resistances on the
side of the developed countries. But it also offers them the possibility
of shifting scarce manpower from traditional lines of production to other
industries where labor can be more productively combined with their
capital resources.
Such a course may also be unwelcome to some of the less developed
countries, implying concentration on relatively simple types of manu-
facturing and perhaps excessive exposure to the risks of international
trade. These disadvantages are scarcely greater, however, than those
entailed in their present heavy reliance on exports of primary products.
And, if the analysis given here points in the right direction, a willingness
to focus initially on labor-intensive lines of manufacturing may be a
necessary condition for evolving toward the production of goods with,
as Fei and Ranis say, "an increasing skill and ingenuity component over
time."
It may be further objected that, apart from qualifications such as that
just given, the approach taken here makes no specific allowance for the
possibility that comparative advantage may shift as development pro-
ceeds, thanks to internal and external economies of scale and other dy-
namic influences associated with growth. How much weight should be
attached to this possibility in the present context is difficult to say, par-
ticularly since so little is available by way of empirical evidence or even
illustrative case histories bearing on the dynamics-of-growth argument.°
John C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, Development of the Labor Surplus Econ-
omy, Homewood, III., 1964, p. 303.
8Viewedwith regard to the possibilities of increasing exports, itis not clear
a priori that the argument could justify a strategy of emphasizing capital-intensive
industries in the early stages of industrial development, since the more developed
countries not only have access to capital on more favorable terms but also the
great advantage of economies of scale already realized. Initially, therefore, and
until their capital resources and market size are increased, the gains from trade
by the less developed countries in importing capital-intensive manufactures are
likely to be particularly large in relation to the volume of trade. See Paul A.The Problem and a Summary of Findings 5
One factual observation deriving from the data examined in Chapter 4
of this study is that, if the argument is deemed to be relevant to, or
consistent with, the need to increase export earnings of the less devel-
oped countries, there is little indication that any of these countries have
so far become competitive in the more capital-intensive lines of manu-
facturing (except, of course, those based on the exploitation of natural
resources). Usually, however, dynamic considerations have not been
related to problems of export promotion but have been invoked rather
to favor a strategy of import substitution and may be subject to the
same need of cautious reappraisal as that seen below.7
Still another possible objection to the present approach is that, even
within a comparative cost framework, the emphasis may be too much
on labor intensity to the neglect of other conditions affecting the ability
of less developed countries to sell manufactures in the markets of the
more advanced countries. Some industries are more strongly market-
oriented than others, and ease of communications between producer and
customer may bear importantly on their location.8 Among consumer
goods, market orientation seems likely to be more important in furni-
ture than in plywood or wood containers, for instance, and in high-style
fashions than in textile flat goods or work clothes. The production of
some producer goods, such as fabricated metals and instruments, tends
to be located near the industries which use these goods as inputs into
their own production. Even in such cases, the increasing speed of in-
ternational communications and growing experience in procuring abroad
may open up new possibilities of siting production where costs are
lowest. This is illustrated by the evolution of the garment industry in
Hong Kong toward high-fashion goods and also by the encouragement
given by American companies to the production of electronic and other
components in low-wage, countries.
Samuelson, Stability and Growth in the American Economy, Stockholm, 1963,
p. 48, and also Gottfried Haberler, "Integration and Growth of the World Econ-
omy in Historical Perspective," American Economic Review, March 1964, pp.
1—22.
Atthe end of hisarticle on "Comparative Advantage and Development
Policy" (American Economic Review, March 1961, pp. 18—48), Hollis B. Chenery
concludes that "To most economists, a survey of the procedures actually followed
in designing development policy would probably suggest that balance is over-
emphasized and that the potential gains from trade are often neglected."
8 For a discussion of this and other influences on industrial location, see Ray-
mond Vernon, Metropolis 1985, Cambridge, 1960, pp. 38—85, and also a paper,
"Problems and Prospects in the Export of Manufactured Goods from the Less-
Developed Countries," contributed by Vernon to the meeting of UNCTAD in 1964
(Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Vol.
IV, Trade in Manufactures, 1964, pp. 200—210).6Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
The "Overspill" View of Exports
The usual approach to the problem of increasing exports of manufac-
tures by the less developed countries has been along the lines of what
Winston Churchill once called the "overspill" view of exports in Britain.
That is, concentrate first on developing the home market, and this will
create the conditions needed for an efficient and rising export trade.
Theoretical support for this view has been elaborated by the Swedish
economist Staffan B. Linder, who takes strong issue with the factor-
proportions explanation of trade, except in primary products. For the
rest, he advances as a "basic proposition" that the "range of exportable
products is determined by internal demand." That is to say, "it is a
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition that a product be consumed
(or invested) in the home country for this product to be a potential ex-
port product." °
W.W. Rostow has put the point in the following way, with more
specific reference to the problems of the less developed countries:
"What I am asserting, then, is that the expansion of the domestic mar-
ket which is required to produce a modernization of rural life and an
ample market for domestic industry is also the proper base for the de-
velopment of diversified exports."
A similar conception seems to infuse programs of financial assist-
ance to the less developed countries. The International Bank's loans
and feasibility studies have mainly focused on the "infrastructure" and
the home markets of the less developed countries and have rarely served
more directly to develop their exports of manufactures. Our AID pro-
grams have also been chiefly concerned with strengthening the internal
conditions for development, though some of the studies of investment
opportunities which it has helped to finance point toward export possi-
bilities. The Export-Import Bank has well merited the first half of its
name by granting credits to finance sales of capital equipment and other
goods to the less developed countries. But little of its financing has been
aimed at stimulating imports from them.
The power and transportation facilities, machinery, and technology
made available through these loans and grants do, of course, help to
build up the economies of the less developed countries and may ulti-
mately serve to diversify and strengthen their exports. Moreover, these
An Essay on Trade and Transformation, 1961, p. 87.
10W.W. Rostow, "Economic Development in Asia," Department of State Bul-
letin, May 31, 1965, p. 850.The Problem and a Summary of Findings 7
public agencies no doubt consider, with some reason, that investment
opportunities offering attractive export prospects are particularly suited
to private initiative and• financing and do not require public develop-
ment aid.
In a perceptive commentary on these and related policies, Harry
Johnson may go too far in saying that "the notion became firmly estab-
lished—especiallyintheUnited States—that developmentisan
autarchic process." ii.Nevertheless,it does seem fair to observe that the
advanced countries have accepted restrictive import policies by the less
developed countries as a necessary accompaniment of industrial de-
velopment, and have so far made little adjustment in their own policies
to facilitate the growth of imports of manufactures from the less de-
veloped countries.
Under these conditions, itis remarkable that this trade, at least
in some products, has grown as fast as it has in recent years. The growth
has, however, been very unevenly distributed by exporting as well as
by importing countries—a fact that underlies the trade demands put
forward with increasing vigor by the less developed countries, during
and since the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) in 1964. The need to find better ways of expanding their
exports' is evident. The means proposed to this end—on either side—are
more debatable, sometimes seeming primarily designed to shift re-
sponsibility for action to other countries while avoiding commitments
that might entail awkward adjustments on one's own part.
Limitations of Market Size
in the Less Developed Countries
Proliferation of Small Countries
However persuasive the argument may seem, it rather begs the ques-
tion to say, with Rostow, that "The most effective base for the export
of manufactures is a large domestic market." According to one esti-
mate,12 only five of the less developed countries have national incomes
(converted to dollars at prevailing rates of exchange) larger than Con-
11HarryG. Johnson, "United States Policy and the Problems of Developing
Countries," Journal of Business, October 1965, p. 339.
12DonaldB. Keesing, "Outward-Looking Policies and Economic Development,"
Economic Journal, June, 1967. Keesing actually refers to six countries, including
Spain, but Spain (along with the rest of Southern Europe) is not counted among
the less developed (or developing) countries in United Nations practice, which
is followed here.8Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
necticut. These are India, Pakistan, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, to
which perhaps Indonesia (with poor statistics but a population of 100
million) should be added. Though the beginnings of industry go back
rather far in some of these countries, none of them has yet done suffi-
ciently well in exporting manufactures to vindicate the "overspill"
view. 18
The six countries just mentioned account for more than half of the
total population of the less developed countries, but that still leaves a
host of people and problems outside as well as inside. Close to 100 of
the less developed countries have a population smaller than 15 million,
and in two-thirds of them it is less than 5 million.14 On the whole very
poor, they are smaller still in size of market compared with most de-
veloped countries. More such countries are being born as Malta,
Gambia, the Mauritius Islands, and the few other remaining European
possessions move toward and achieve independence. This proliferation
of small and minuscule nations is largely a product of the swift un-
raveling of colonialism after World War II, though in Central America
it goes far back into the last century.
The dilemma facing these small countries is evident upon comparing
two quotations from Charles Kindleberger.15 On the one hand, be ex-
presses a view like Linder's that "A further important modification of
the law of comparative advantage based on abundant labor is that ex-
ports can be developed only in those products for which there is a
significant home market." On the other hand, he says elsewhere: "The
smaller the economy in geographic area, the more skewed [i.e., spe-
cialized in resources and production] it is likely to be and the more
it must trade outside its borders." Together, the two statements imply
that (apart from products of such natural resources as they may
have) small and poor countries will be able to develop only an ex-
tremely narrow range of goods for export. These would be a few
mass-consumption products for which even the smaller less developed
countries may provide "significant home markets" in relation to the
levels of output needed for efficient production.
13 Mexico might be considered an exception, yet during recent years the Mexi-
can government has found it desirable to take a number of measures to limit
sharply the protection of domestic industry and to try to make it more competitive
internationally. See International Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce,
June 6, 1966, pp. 14—17.
14Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Vol. II, Policy Statements, 1964, p. 15.
15 Charles P. Kindleberger, Foreign Trade and the National Economy, New
Haven, 1962, pp. 32 and 58.The Problem and a Summary of Findings 9
Uncertain Prospects for Regional Integration
In principle, one way of meeting this dilemma is by integration of
these splinter economies into larger and more viable regional groupings
following, at a great distance, the example of the European Common
Market. There are excellent reasons favoring this course and commend-
ing it to outside support—even apart from any hope which harried
officials in developed countries may hold of being thereby relieved in
some measure of the problem of increasing imports from the less de-
veloped countries.
So far, efforts to combine into larger regional entities have brought
little specific result. In some areas, the trend is rather the other way, as
indicated by the strains and disruptions experienced in the West Indies,
Malaysia, East Africa, and Nigeria. Little progress is evident in the
Maghreb, which was supposed to embrace the Arab states of North
Africa. The most promising of these regional endeavors, the Central
American Common Market, illustrates the limitations more than the
potentialities of such arrangements. It brings together a fairly homo-
geneous group of countries, compared with most others, and even so
adds up to only 12 million people with a combined purchasing power
less than that of any one of a number of European and American cities.
Now a far larger, more difficult, and more distant objective has been
set with the commitment by the heads of the Latin American states in
April 1967 at Punta del Este, "Beginning in 1970, to establish progres-
sively the Latin American Common Market, which should be substan-
tially in operation within a period of no more than fifteen years." 16
Thelength of the period set for achievement of the objective attests to
the difficulties to be overcome.
In some regions political and social frictions may well be the major
obstacle to regional integration. The economic difficulties include dis-
parities in the levels of development attained by different countries of
the same region, since laggard countries tend to fear competition by
their more advanced neighbors. Even more awkward problems may be
presented by disparities among countries in the levels and structures of
production costs and prices. Barriers of the latter nature are, in turn,
largely the result of the exaggerated pursuit of "import substitution"
as a means of promoting industrial development.
From the "Declaration of the Presidents of America," Department of State
Bulletin, May 8, 1967, pp. 712—721.10Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
Costs of Excessive Import Substitution
A developing country has some room for choice in orienting its new
industries toward replacing imports rather than expanding exports.
Initially, the emphasis is likely to be on the former course, since im-
ports attest to a market already in being at home and susceptible of
being reserved against foreign competition.'7 Most and perhaps all de-
veloped countries have followed this course in the early stages of their
growth and, indeed, still cling to protection even though with little basis
any more for invoking the "infant industry" argument. Within limits,
this course is consistent with the "overspil" view of exports, since, if
the industries chosen for protection are well suited to a country's po-
tentials, substitution for imports in its home market may set the stage
for competition in export markets later on.
These limits, however, can be quickly exceeded. A less developed
country's imports typically embrace a far greater variety of goods than
its exports. The difference is all the more striking if one considers not
merely final goods but also the materials, parts, and capital equipment
entering into their production. Import substitution may therefore soon
spread a country's resources too thin over numerous small and ineffi-
cient enterprises, and extend to types of production ill suited to its
conditions, with the unfortunate result of raising costs even in indus-
tries in which it should otherwise be able to compete. A further conse-
quence is to deny the economy the stimulus to efficiency and innovation
which exposure to competition in domestic and foreign markets can
provide.
In other words, "backward and forward linkages" with other indus-
triesmayprove to be a burden rather than a blessing if the indus-
tries selected for promotion are not well suited to a country's capabil-
ities and size. This may happen even in the largest of the less developed
countries, as is suggested by India's difficulties in providing the range
and quality of parts and other inputs needed to produce diesel engines
for trucks and by the cost and insufficiency of domestic synthetic fibers
and artificial rubber used in the production of tires.1°Similarly, a
As Albert 0. Hirschman put it, "imports still provide the safest, most incon-
trovertible proof that the market is there" (The Strategy of Economic Develop-
ment, New Haven, 1958, p. 212).
18Ibid.,pp. 98ff.
19JackBaranson, "Transfer of Technical Knowledge by International Corpo-
rations to Developing Economies," American Economic Review, May 1966, pp.
259—267, and Wilfred Malenbaum, "Comparative Costs and Economic Develop-
ment: The Experience of India," American Economic Review, May 1964, p. 396.The Problem and a Summary of Findings 11
United Nations review of protectionism and industrial development in
Latin America is illustrated by examples from Argentina showing the
unfavorable effects of high-cost sulphur and sulphuric acid on the pro-
duction of chemicals and of high-cost caustic soda on the manufacture of
soap.2° Considerable caution would therefore seem to be warranted with
respect to the various internal and external economies which have fre-
quently been invoked in favor of capital-intensive industries at early
stages of economic development.
The frustrations of import substitution were the subject of an urgent
warning by Prebisch in his advance message, as Secretary General,
to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.21 Based
largely on his close observation of the Latin American countries, he
found that the "easy phase" of import substitution had about reached
its limit in the countries which had followed that course, and that it
could not go farther without considerable waste. He also found that
high tariffs to protect narrow national markets had "encouraged the
establishment of small uneconomical plants, weakened the incentive to
introduce modern techniques, and slowed down the rise in productivity."
"Thus," Prebisch continued, "a real vicious circle has been created
as regards exports of manufactured goods. These exports encounter
great difficulties because internal costs are high, and internal costs are
high because, among other reasons, the exports which would enlarge
the markets are lacking. Had it been possible to develop industrial ex-
ports, the process of industrialization would have been more econom-
ical, for it would have made possible the international division of labour
in manufacturing."
Responsibility for exaggerated import substitution does not fall only
on the governments of the less developed countries and their, advisers.
Two world wars and the Great Depression in between were reason
enough for many countries to try to produce at home what, in those
circumstances, they were no longer able to buy abroad. But the least
to be said in criticism of the less developed countries is that so far they
have shown little tendency to reverse course and expose their small
monopolies to' outside competition.
20SantiagoMacario, "Protectionism and Industrialization in Latin America,"
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, United Nations, March 1964, p. 79. The
same issue contains arelevantarticle on "The Growth and Decline of Import
Substitution in Brazil."
2lProceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Vol. II, Policy Statements, p. 14.12Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
Regional or International Integration
Under the conditions described, negotiations for regional integration
by various groups of less developed countries are likely to mean hard
bargaining for mutual support, and reciprocal sacrifice, of high-cost
industries.22 With each participant concerned lest it lose more than it
gains, the difficulties of arriving at agreement and successful implemen-
tation are apparent.
Considered in this light, it may be significant that the one regional
grouping which has been showing signs of progress toward integration
—the Central American Common Market—is one whose member states
had previously remained relatively open to the outside world and con-
sequently did not differ widely from each other in their cost and price
structures. Nor, it must be added, did the members differ much in the
relatively low state of their industrial development. There may be, in
fact, some risk that the progress now being registered in their manu-
facturing output and in their trade with each other could prove to be an-
other example of what Prebisch called the "easy phase" of import sub-
stitution. The outcome is likely to depend on how successful they are in
diversifying and expanding their exports to other countries at the same
time as they increase their trade within the area.
Political conditions permitting, other countries with relatively simple
and open economies may be able to form local economic unions on the
Central American model. That experience also suggests the paradoxical
thought that countries where import substitution has gone much further,
such as most of the other Latin American countries, may be able to
move toward regional integration only by first reintegrating with the
world economy and bringing their cost and price structures more in
line with those outside.23 A different, and perhaps more realistic, strat-
22 In a sympathetic review of the slow progress and special difficulties of inte-
gration among the less developed countries, Gunnar Myrdal states, "This means
that a simple 'common market' is not enough; it must be completed by formal
agreements, reached after negotiation, concerning what industries should be located
in what countries. When thought through with all its consequences, this implies the
need for a joint common planning" (paper, "The Efforts Toward Integration in
Rich and Poor Countries," delivered in Mexico City on October 3,1966).
Myrdal notes, however, that the difficulties of achieving this objective are "formid-
able," and Sydney Dell, in A Latin American Common Market? (New York,
1966), while also stressing the necessity of common planning, says, "Of course, it
may be unrealistic to talk of regional planning in Latin America at a time when
even national planning cannot be said to have a very firm foundation in most
countries of the region" (p. 212).
23 In that event, the objectives of integration would presumably be largely
political.The Problem and a Summary of Findings 13
egy is evidently, reflected in the renewed effort toward economic union
undertaken at Punta del Este; namely, as Joseph Grunwald has ex-
pressed it, that integration is a "means of lifting the Latin American
countries to a level of economic maturity where, without the aid of
inefficient protection, they will eventually be able to compete as equal
partners with the developed nations." 24Theexpectation underlying
this strategy, as expounded by Grunwald, is that integration would ex-
pand market perspectives, allow a more rational allocation of resources,
permit economies of scale, spur competition, and stimulate private in-
vestment. Also, a "protected region-wide market" would provide the
catalyst needed to break down economic, political, and social rigidities
and restore economic viability.
This may be a correct appraisal of the Latin American problem and
the most promising way of accelerating growth in the region. It seems
unlikely, however, that this approach will significantly alleviate the need
for a rapid increase in exports to other areas, particularly in view of
the extended period—1970 to 1985—over which the common market
is to be achieved. In the worst case, regional integration could hinder
such an increase in exports if it were to mean the spread of cost-raising
import substitution to countries in the region which, otherwise, would
set their policies toward becoming more competitive in world mar-
kets.
Summary of the Study
To recapitulate, this study accepts as its point• of departure that if
the less developed countries are to earn foreign exchange in amounts
commensurate with their needs, they will have to achieve a rapid in-
crease in their exports of manufactures to the developed countries. This
is where the world's buying power is concentrated, as long as levels of
economic development remain so far apart, and it is also where the
less developed countries will have to obtain most of the capital equip-
ment and much of the materials and even some of the food needed by
their growing economies and population.
24"SomeReflections on Latin American Industrialization Policy," paper pre-
sented at the conference on Key Problems of Economic Policy in Latin America,
University of Chicago, November 9, 1966 (mimeographed, p. 40). W. W. Rostow
expressed much the same thought in a lecture at the University of Leeds, Eng-
land, on February 23, 1967; that is, that the Latin American countries "must go
through a transitional stage of regional protectionism before they can emerge
with competitive efficiency on the world scene" (Department of State Bulletin,
March 27, 1967, p. 498).14Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries
Value Added as a Guide to Factor Intensity
The next question, to which Chapter 2 is devoted, is to try to identify
the kinds of manufactures in which the less developed countries are
most likely to hold or to be able to achieve a comparative advantage
in international trade. According to the factor-proportions theorem
and leaving aside strongly resource-based industries, these would be
products requiring large inputs of relatively unskilled labor compared
with both human capital, or skills, and physical capital. Rejecting cer-
tain criticisms of this theorem, the chapter examines the rationale of
taking value added by manufacture per employee (roughly, value of
output minus value of materials used divided by employment) as a
guide to interindustry differences in capital intensity. By this criterion,
the higher the value added per employee, the more capital-intensive
the industry, and the lower the value added per employee, the more
labor-intensive it is.
Though affected by various market imperfections, value added per
employee has significant advantages as a measure of factor intensity in
manufacturing. One is that this measure may be taken to reflect the
flows of services into the manufacturing process from both human cap-
ital and physical capital, and permits their treatment on a common
basis. Another advantage is that value added per employee is available
in considerable industrial detail for the United States and a number of
other countries from their censuses of manufactures. The use of this
measure contrasts with the usual reliance on more infrequent statistics
of stocks of physical capital as a measure of capital intensity, sometimes
supplemented by verbal qualifications with regard to skill requirements.
To test the validity of this approach, value added per employee is
then broken down into its wage-and-salary component and the rest, and
significant relations are found across industries between the first com-
ponent and other measures of skill and between the second and stocks
of physical capital. It appears that value added per employee isa
reasonably good, though not infallible, guide to the capital intensity of
different industries.
By this criterion, the labor-intensive industries include such major
industry groups in the census of manufactures as textiles, clothing,
lumber and wood products, furniture, leather and leather products, and
the broad group of miscellaneous manufactures. They would also include
many important components of other groups, such as motorcycles and
bicycles, cutlery and various other metal products, chinaware and pot-
tery, ceramic tiles, glass containers, paperboard containers, pleasureThe Problem and a Summary of Findings 15
•craft and other small boats, and various kinds of printed matter and
printing services.
All of these items are counted as labor-intensive on the basis of the
direct factor inputs into manufacturing, ignoring the factor intensity of
material inputs on the assumption that the latter are ubiquitous or read-
fly transportable. The final section of Chapter 2 suggests that a few
other items more closely tied to the origin of the material inputs—
chiefly certain canned or preserved foods—may also be counted as
labor-intensive on the basis that, in these cases, the material inputs
themselves as well as the processing of the materials are labor-intensive.
A Common World Pattern
Chapter 3 explores the question whether or not the interindustry
pattern of factor intensity found for the United States would be valid
for other countries as well, particularly for countries in which skills and
physical capital are relatively scarce and unskilled labor abundant.
Theoretical arguments, along with some limited empirical evidence,
have been given elsewhere for supposing that industries would differ
significantly in their propensities to substitute labor for capital, and that
they would therefore rank differently from country to country in factor
intensity. The question is of crucial significance to the factor-propor-
tions theorem, which could not provide reliable guidance to compara-
tive advantage and specialization in international trade if the notion of
"factor-intensity reversals" were borne out.
Despite problems of comparability, the analysis of value added per
employee in the United States and other countries, developed in Chap-
ter 3 at various levels of industrial aggregation, gives little evidence of
factor-intensity reversals. The comparisons tend rathertosupport
the strong-factor-intensity hypothesis underlying the factor-proportions
theorem and, more specifically, the relevance of the U.S. pattern of
factor intensities to other countries at very different levels of economic
development and with very different factor-price ratios. The selection
of labor-intensive manufactures based on value added per employee in
the United States stands up well on the basis of similar data for other
countries, including detailed comparisons with the United Kingdom,
Japan, and India.
The section of Chapter 3 is devoted to cotton textiles in
the light of various statements to the effect that this industry is becoming
"highly capital-intensive"—a change virtually completed in the United
States and Japan, according to an OECD committee report, but still
slowly proceeding in Europe. This view is sometimes invoked as a rea-16Imports of from Less Develdped Countries
son why, pending completicii of the transformation and to assist in it,
imports of cotton textiles the less developed countries con-
tinue to be curbed The analysis given here indicates that, though cap-
ital expenditures in industry significantly during first
half of the 1960's, itstill ranks as strongly labor-intensive by
parisoii with other industries according to the criterion of value added
per employee. It seems unlikely that the less developed countries are
about to lose their comparative advantage in cotton textiles.
of the Trade
A detailed selectibn of labor-intensive manufactures, is made at the
beginnhiig of Chapter 4 on the of the cnteria developed in the
two preceding chapters. Then, after the trade figures intp
four main groups, the import of those foreign countries which
include freight and insurance (c i 1) adjusted down to an f o b
basis to render the data both more with United States im
ports and more meaningful asmeasure of jayments to less developed
countries.
Analysis of the imports of labOr-intensive manufactures by developed
from less developed countries brihgs out the main features
1. The trade is relatively sniall; accounting in 1965 for less than 10
per cent of total imports by developed from less countries.
The share of imports countries ih total imports of
labor-intensive manufactures by countries was also small—
about 13per cent (exckiding certalh items the margin between
labor-intehsive and are much less important
in importh from less developed thafl in from other
sources).
2. The trade is highly concentrated by destination, and prod-
uct. Hong Kong alone supplied 28 centthe 1965 total, and all
together the less developed copntriesthe Far East supplied two-
thirds. The United States took álrnost42 cent of the imports and,
together with the United Khigdorn and Wè,st Germany, 72 per cent:
Textiles and clothing, of of jute and other coarse
fibers, made up almost one-thIrd of the or 45 per cent if the
coarse-fiber items are included.
3. The trade has grown very rapidly in recent years. i:n 1965 the
total was 4.3 times the 1953 level, an increase averaging abOut 13 per
cent per annum, unadjusted for price increases, or perhaps one or
percentage points less if so adjusted. This is much faster than seems to
have been generally expected only a few years ago. Recently, the increaseThe Problem and a Summary of Findings 17
has been much faster in miscellaneous light consumer manufactures
than in the other three groups (textiles, food products, and processed
materials).
Reasons are given in the final section of Chapter 4 for thinking that
there may be a continued rapid growth in the trade. An important
condition, however, is that the structure of wages in less developed
countries not be such as to nullify their comparative advantage in labor-
intensive products. This qualification seems to apply to a number of
the less developed countries and may explain why some of the more
advanced among them have not done well as exporters of labor-
intensive manufactures while still unable to compete in other manufac-
tures. Otherwise, the ability of the less developed countries to export
labor-intensive manufactures should continue to strengthen as they
gain experience and as incomes rise in the developed countries.
Policy Choices and Results
How fast imports of manufactures from the less developed countries
increase depends not only on the strengthening of their competitive
position and the growth of demand in the importing countries but also
on the extent to which the latters' commercial policies inhibit these
forces. Chapter 5 reviews two main types of interference with the flow
of trade. One is direct controls exemplified in the "Long-Term Cotton
Textile Arrangement." The other is the structure of tariffs, rates gener-
ally rising with the stage of manufacture so that the effective level of
protection of finished products is typically higher than the nominal
level. This is scarcely less true of the United States than of other
countries, but the effect, judged by the composition of trade, neverthe-
less seems to be much less restrictive here than in western Continental
Europe and Japan.
The final section of Chapter 5 concerns the debate over commercial
policy in the developed countries and, in particular, the demand of the
less developed countries for tariff preferences. It is suggested that the
outcome is likely to be a mixed bag at best, with both positive and
negative features in enlarging market opportunities for less developed
countries. Under these conditions, it would be important to make sure
that the policies followed by the developed countries, however they
may differ from each other, are at least consistent with the results
aimed at and, therefore, to express the results anticipated in explicit
quantitative terms with regard to the level and growth of imports of
manufactures from the less developed countries.